Deputy AG Emphasizes Continued Individual Accountability for Corporate Misconduct

As observers have been monitoring the evolving policies and priorities of the Department of Justice in the Trump administration, one of the questions has been what the agency’s approach will be to the guidelines laid out in the so-called Yates Memo. The Yates Memo, named for its author, the former Deputy Attorney General and former Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, reflected a commitment to holding individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing. In a recent speech, the current Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein addressed the question of the current administration’s approach to individual accountability. His October 6, 2017 speech, a copy of which can be found here, appears to suggest that the current administration likely will continue to pursue the policies reflected in the Yates Memo. However, as discussed below, what that may mean in practice remains to be seen.

Rosenstein opened his speech with a series of comments suggesting that past practices periodically should be reviewed and prior assumptions reconsidered. On the topic of corporate crime, he expressly noted that the Yates Memo is one of the agency’s prior policy statements under review. But having acknowledged the review, he went on to say that “I generally agree with the critique that motivated Deputy Attorney General Yates to issue a new policy,” adding that “Federal prosecutors should be cautious about closing investigations in return for corporate payments, without pursuing individuals who broke the law.”

Having noted that the Yates memo is under review, he observed that “any adjustments or changes will reflect several common themes.” First, any changes “will reflect our resolve to hold individuals accountable for corporate wrongdoing.” Second, they will “affirm that the government should not use criminal authority unfairly to extract civil payments.” Third, any changes “will make the policy more clear and more concise.”

Commenting later in the speech about the agency’s approach to White Collar Crime prosecution, Rosenstein added that in trying to set the right tone within the agency, “We are fostering a culture that supports and promotes the investigation and prosecution of individual perpetrators of corporate fraud.” He added that the agency is “establishing a working group to evaluate and monitor the Department’s long term effectiveness in promoting individual accountability and deterring fraud.”

The purposed of enforcement, Rosenstein noted, is to try to deter misconduct. Focusing on deterrence, he observed, requires us to “think carefully about what we can achieve in our enforcement actions.” Corporate settlements “do not necessarily directly deter individual wrongdoers.” Rather, “by effectively combating corporate misconduct and prosecuting individuals when appropriate, we can protect Americans from fraud.” He concluded by saying “We need to make clear our intent to enforce the rules, with sufficient rigor that people fear the consequences of violating them.”

Rosenstein’s speech included some statistics that provide a little bit of specificity on the question of what the emphasis on individual accountability really means for corporate directors and officers. Citing statistics from the United States Sentencing Commission, he reported that 132 organizations were convicted of federal offenses during 2016, nine-tenths of which employed fewer than 1,000 people. More than half of the organizational convictions involved the separate conviction of at least one related individual. Forty percent of the convicted individuals were board members or owners of businesses. Others included supervisory or management-level employees. Many of the cases, Rosenstein noted, did not involve well-known companies or American’s wealthiest executives.

Discussion

The bottom line is that the focus on individual accountability for corporate is going to continue in the new administration, even if the DoJ reassesses or adjusts the specifics in the Yates Memo. The sentencing statistics that Rosenstein cites shows what this approach means for executives at companies that the DoJ targets. Individuals face the possibility of direct personal liability.

While Rosenstein’s speech strongly communicates the message that individual accountability will remain an agency priority, the specifics of what that will mean are not as clear. For example, it isn’t clear to what extent the cooperation requirement reflected in the Yates memo remains a part of this policy. The cooperation requirement specified that in order for a company to receive credit for cooperating with the DoJ, the companies “must provide the Department all relevant facts about individuals involved in corporate misconduct.”

This cooperation prerequisite arguably represented the most contentious aspects of the policies described in the Yates memo. It arguably requires company seeking credit to conduct their own investigations and then to come forward and point the finger at culpable employees or executives. Some observers contended that the memo’s requirement of the disclosure of “all facts” put companies at risk of later charges that the company was not sufficiently forthcoming or held back information. The “all facts” prerequisite also was said to create potential attorney-client privilege issues.

Unless or until it is clear that this cooperation requirement is no longer operative, executives at companies that are the target of DoJ investigations may well conclude that they would be well-advised to have their own counsel as early as possible in the process. The statistics Rosenstein cited suggest that individuals do indeed have reason to be concerned, particularly given the corporate organization’s incentive to offer up individuals in order to try to obtain cooperation credit.

With multiple sets of lawyers separately incurring legal fees, all of which may operate to erode the D&O insurance programs limits of liability, the policy proceeds could quickly be eroded. This concern has important implications for companies when they are deciding limits adequacy questions when they are putting their insurance in place.

 

While we wait to see what the new administration’s policies and priorities mean for these specific aspects of the Yates memo, one thing we know for sure is that there is unlikely to be a “Rosenstein memo.”

On the issue of memos, in his speech Rosenstein said “I regret that it has become a hallmark of expertise in the white-collar arena to know the name of every former Deputy Attorney General who issued a memo about the prosecution of corporate fraud.” Rosenstein professed a professional preference for agency policies to be compiled and reflected in the United States Attorneys’ Manual rather than in a myriad of other documents and materials, like, for example, a memo. He said that “management by memo is inefficient,” adding that the Deputy Attorney General “should not be known for writing memos.”

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Happy Halloween!

Happy Halloween to our Blog Followers! We wanted to share our Advertising, Marketing & Digital Media group’s tribute to great advertising spokespeople. This was our group entry in the Venable annual costume competition. We had stiff competition from the IP group patent troll, but dressing up together made us all laugh and remember why we have so much joy doing what we do every day. Thank you all for making it so much fun!! Be safe out there and may your night be filled with more treats than tricks.

Pictured from left to right: Steve Freeland as Dos Equis Most Interesting Man in the World, Amy Mudge as Progressive Flo, Renato Perez as Juan Valdez, Shahin Rothermel as Kool-Aid (wo)man, Chuck Wilkins as Mr. Clean, Melissa Steinman as Red the Wendy’s Girl, Brian Tengel as Brawny Man, and Randy Shaheen as Papa John. Not shown: Ellen Berge as Orbit Gum Girl, Christopher Boone as Mac, Jack Ferry as Tony the Tiger, and Katie Sheridan as the (other) Most Interesting Man in the World.

Venable's Advertising, Marketing & Digital Media Group Halloween Costumes


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Creepy Code Section Alert: Cal. Bus. and Prof. §16603

comicbook scareScrolling online through the California Business and Professions Code the other day, I was struck by a frightening sight. My pulse raced. My jaw dropped. I called out to an associate for help. I wanted to make sure that I what I was seeing was real, i.e., that I wasn’t out of my mind. Many lawyers have read California Business and Professions Code Section 16600 by which California outlaws covenants not to compete. But click a few code sections over and you’ll be shocked!

Section 16603 has to be one of the strangest (and most seasonally appropriate) laws ever. It targets the two-for-one sale of comic books, stating: “Every person who, as a condition to a sale or consignment of any magazine, book, or other publication requires that the purchaser or consignee purchase or receive for sale any horror comic book, is guilty of a misdemeanor” punishable by jail time up to six months or a fine up to $1000. The section goes on to define a horror comic book with specificity:

“As used in this section ‘horror comic book’ means any book or booklet in which an account of the commission or attempted commission of the crime of arson, assault with caustic chemicals, assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem, murder, rape, robbery, theft, or voluntary manslaughter is set forth by means of a series of five or more drawings or photographs in sequence, which are accompanied by either narrative writing or words represented as spoken by a pictured character, whether such narrative words appear in balloons, captions or on or immediately adjacent to the photograph or drawing.”

In other words, in California, the law says you could go to jail if – as a condition to purchase a Fantastic Four comic book – you require a customer to also purchase a Spider Man comic book. Holy Hallucination Batman! (I know we’re now mixing Marvel and DC.) And by the statute’s definition, five narrated drawings about the Gargamel v. Smurfs, Tom v. Jerry, or Spy v. Spy mayhem qualifies as a “horror comic book”!

Stating the obvious, the statute has to have been a solution in search of a problem. Why would a comic book seller ever insist that a purchaser buy a second comic book as a condition of buying the first? And why would the California legislature ever be so worried about this scenario or so worried about comic books to ever pass this law?

But beware! Section 16603 remains on the books, along with a law restricting the tossing of flying discs on the beaches of Los Angeles in certain circumstances (Los Angeles Municipal Code §17.12.1430) and a law prohibiting bird hunting while intoxicated (California Fish and Game Code §3001). No doubt, decades ago, comic books struck fear in the hearts of many. In the 1940’s and 50’s, critics called them “a strain on the young eyes and young nervous system” and “pulp paper nightmares,” “loaded with communist teachings, sex, and racial discrimination,” and “flaunted alluringly in the faces of children at many stores, to be purchased and read without guidance.”

The legislative history on Section 16603 is missing color and illustration. California Bill No. 1598, “[a]n act to add Section 16603 to the Business and Professions Code, relating to tie-in sales of horror comic books” was brought to the floor by California State Senator Hugh P. Donnelly. In 1983, it was amended to increase the maximum fine from $500 to $1000. In 1993, the California legislature unsuccessfully tried to amend to include car-jacking as one of the crimes whose inclusion constitutes a horror comic book.

Having considered all of this, I now realize that comic books really aren’t so frightening at all. Doctor Doom, the Green Goblin, Magneto … no big deal. That’s just fiction. What is far more spine-chilling is reality … too many instances of inexplicably bizarre behavior by elected officials. But at least we can be comforted to know this is nothing new. Be careful, comic book sellers! And Happy Halloween!

comic about comic sales


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D&O Insurer’s Withholding of Settlement Consent Held Reasonable

D&O insurance policies typically specify that the insurer’s written consent is required for a policyholder to settle a claim, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. This consent-to-settlement clause is the not infrequent source of coverage disputes, usually involving circumstances where the policyholder has gone ahead and settled a claim without seeking the requisite consent. A less frequent but no less troublesome circumstance involves the situation where the policyholder sought consent but the insurer declined to consent. The question then becomes whether the insurer’s withholding of consent was (or was not) reasonable.

In an interesting recent ruling, an Arizona district court judge held that Apollo Education Group’s D&O insurer’s withholding of consent to the company’s $13.125 million settlement of an options backdating-related securities class action lawsuit was reasonable. There are a number of interesting aspects to this ruling, as discussed below. Judge Stephen Logan’s October 26, 2017 decision in the Apollo Education Group coverage lawsuit can be found here.

Background

As detailed here, in November 2006, Apollo and certain of its directors and officers were sued in the District of Arizona in a securities class action lawsuit related to alleged backdated options grants made to company management.  In March 2011, the district court entered an order (here) granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint. The plaintiff appealed. While the appeal was pending, the parties to the options backdating lawsuit reached an agreement to settle the case, based upon the company’s agreement to pay $13.125 million.

Apollo’s insurer refused to consent to the settlement. Apollo paid the settlement out of its own funds and then filed a lawsuit against its insurer alleging breach of contract and bad faith. In its coverage lawsuit, Apollo contended that the insurer’s refusal to consent to the settlement was unreasonable and therefore constituted a breach of duty under the terms of the policy. The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment.

The relevant provision of Apollo’s D&O insurance policy provides as follows:

The Insureds shall not … enter into any settlement agreement… without the prior written consent of the Insurer. Only those settlements … which have been consented to by the Insurer shall be recoverable as Loss under the terms of this policy.  The Insurer’s consent shall not be unreasonably withheld ….

The October 26, 2017 Order

In his October 26, 2017 order, Judge Logan, applying Arizona law, granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurer had reasonably withheld consent.

In reaching this conclusion, Judge Logan reviewed the actions the insurer had undertaken in response to Apollo’s request for consent to the settlement. The insurer, Judge Logan noted, “considered the terms and undertook an assessment of a variety of factors, including several other cases that were similar in nature” to the Apollo backdating lawsuit, and also considered the parties’ pleadings, the various rulings of the district court judge in the backdating suit, as well as the decisions of the SEC and the DoJ not to bring an enforcement action against Apollo.

The insurer, Judge Logan said, “concluded that settlement was premature – and likely unnecessary – because of the probability that [Apollo] would prevail on appeal.” Judge Logan added that the insurer had concluded that even in “the unlikely event” that Apollo did not prevail on appeal, there were a “variety of other hurdles” the plaintiff in the options backdating suit would have to overcome in order to recover a “substantial judgment” against Apollo.

Judge Logan said that “by conducting this extensive analysis weighing the … settlement, taken in conjunction with the express terms of [Apollo’s] policy, it is clear that [the insurer] fulfilled its obligation to [Apollo] by considering the terms of the … settlement and the [Apollo’s] breach of contract claim must fail as a matter of law.” Because the breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law “because of the reasonableness of [the insurer’s] actions,” Apollo’s bad faith claim also fails as a matter of law.

Discussion

Even though most D&O insurance policies give the insurer the right to consent to settlements, it is in fact relatively rare for an insurer to withhold its consent to settle for the simple reason that the insurer has no way of knowing at the time whether a court later will conclude that their withholding of consent was or was not reasonable. The risk for an insurer in withholding consent is that if the court concludes that the insurer unreasonably withheld consent, the insurer could become liable for extracontractual damages.

The risks for the insurer in withholding consent are compounded where, as here, the policyholder goes ahead and funds the disputed settlement out of its own funds. The policyholder’s willingness to fund the settlement out of its own resources lends some strong psychological weight to the notion that the settlement was reasonable.

To be sure, the circumstances involved here were highly unusual. The insured company had secured the dismissal of the underlying complaint in the district court, yet while the plaintiffs’ appeal of the dismissal was pending, the defendant company agreed to settle the case – a case that had been dismissed at the district court – for $13.125 million, an amount that was far from de minimis and that could hardly be characterized as a cost of defense compromise. Given the circumstances of the settlement and the large settlement amount, it is not hard to see why the carrier might have balked.

There is some context to this situation that might help explain what was going on. This case was not Apollo’s first go-round with a securities class action lawsuit. The company and some of its executives has been sued in a separate securities class action lawsuit in 2004 based on allegations that the company had used a variety of means to boost its reported enrollment figures at its for-profit education business.

In that prior case, the company made the unusual decision not to settle the case, but instead took the case to trial. This aggressive approach backfired on the company, when the January 2008 trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs of $277.5 million.

It looked as if the company snatched victory from the jaws of defeat when the trial judge entered a post-trial order setting aside the verdict and granting Apollo judgment as a matter of law (as discussed here).

Apollo’s triumph proved to be short-lived, as in June 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge’s entry of judgment as a matter of law in Apollo’s favor, and reinstated the jury verdict. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Apollo’s petition for a writ of certiorari, and the case returned to the district court for further proceeding consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

On remand to the district court, Apollo raised a number of issues in connection with the entry of judgment in the case. While these procedural issues were pending, the parties entered mediation and in December 2011 reached an agreement to settle the long-running case for $145 million (as discussed here).

In light of the way that the prior securities suit ultimately played out, as well as all of the twists and turns that took place along the way, it arguably comes as no surprise that the company was uninterested in a prolonged fight in the options backdating case. After all, Apollo had managed to secure a post-trial entry of judgment as a matter of law in the prior securities suit, only to see its apparent victory dashed at the Ninth Circuit. Apollo, more so than many other litigants, had a bitterly won appreciation for the risks involved in an appeal, even in the context of a win at the district court level.

While this historical background may help explain (or at least supply the context for) the company’s decision to try to settle the case on appeal despite having secured dismissal at the district court, the circumstances in that prior securities lawsuit have little relevance to the question of whether or not the insurer was or was not reasonable in withholding its consent to the settlement of the options backdating lawsuit.

Judge Logan’s ruling in the coverage lawsuit validates the insurer’s decision to withhold consent, but I doubt this outcome by itself is going to encourage more insurers to withhold consent in many other cases. Most insurers understand that their decision to withhold consent will be viewed narrowly by later courts. My view is that most courts are predisposed against anything that they see as impeding negotiated case resolution. The body of consent-to-settle case law includes a variety of cases where insurers have been held to have unreasonably withheld consent, even in some pretty extenuating circumstances (refer, for example, here).

There is another reason why an insurer’s withholding of consent is and should be unusual, and that is because by withholding consent, the insurer is in effect reaching an assessment of the case contrary not only to the policyholder but contrary to defense counsel. An insurer’s decision to withhold consent to settlement in the face of the defense counsel’s recommendation basically puts the insurer in the position of trying to substitute its judgment for that of the counsel that has been directly involved in litigating the case. The insurer may well disagree with the policyholder’s and defense counsel’s assessment of the case, but the mere disagreement alone is hardly going to be enough to establish that its withholding of settlement consent is reasonable. It goes without saying that it is not going to be enough for the insurer to show that its withholding of consent is reasonable merely because the insurer thinks the proposed amount of the settlement is too high.

To be sure, the point in the case when the insurer has to decide whether or not it is going to consent can be fraught. The situation can be highly contentious. Disputes may be unavoidable in certain kinds of cases, particularly where the parties and the insurer have widely different views about the merits of or value of the underlying claim. One thing policyholders can do to try to avoid or minimize these kinds of disputes is to keep the insurers (including in particular the excess insurers) informed about settlement discussions in the case. Nothing is likelier to cause problems than for an insured than to spring a fully negotiated settlement on the insurer out of the blue. Again, it is not going to be possible to avoid disputes in some cases, but the possibility of a dispute arising can be reduced by the simple but important step of keeping the insurers fully informed about settlement discussions. (It is probably worth adding that courts have held that an insurer is justified in withholding its settlement consent where the policyholder is found to have “cut out” its insurer from the settlement process.)

One final note. It is clear from Judge Logan’s opinion that a key reason that the insurer was able to persuade him that its withholding of consent was reasonable is that the insurer showed that it had undertaken a thorough consideration of the proposed settlement and of the relevant circumstances. Judge Logan characterized the insurer’s review process as having involved “extensive analysis.” It bears emphasizing that an insurer’s withholding of consent is likelier to be found reasonable where it can show that it undertook this type of extensive analysis. In the absence of this type of showing, it is going to be harder for an insurer to establish that its withholding of consent was reasonable.

Tribute: Everyone here at The D&O Diary was saddened by the news this past week of the death of music legend Fats Domino. Even if he had not produced so many classic songs, Fats Domino would be worth remembering and honoring if for no other reason than his absolutely fabulous name. Fats Domino (born Antoine Dominque Domino, a great name in its own right) had one of the world’s all-time great names. He  also make a bunch of great records. Our personal favorite is his cover of the song first made famous by the Glenn Miller Band, Blueberry Hill.  Here’s a YouTube video of Fats (or should I say, Mr. Domino) singing the classic song – sorry about the commercial at the beginning, it is short.

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California Tightens Auto-Renewal Requirements

financial lawMany time-strapped consumers count on household subscription services to simplify life. One quick purchase agreement with automatically renewing payments, and consumers can receive uninterrupted access to the latest streaming shows, months of lifestyle subscription boxes, or online cloud storage to back up all the family vacation photos. But sometimes consumers aren’t clear on how to unsubscribe or exactly what price they’ll pay after a discounted or free trial period. Thus, many states are enacting or updating their Automatic Renewal Laws (“ARLs”) to ensure consumer protection.

On the heels of increased class action filings under California’s current ARL (see e.g., Kruger v. Hulu; Wahl v. Yahoo! Inc.), the Sunshine State continues to tighten the reins on automatic renewals and continuous service providers with newly enacted Senate Bill 313. California’s expiring ARL was enacted in 2010. It requires auto-renewing consumer contracts to clearly and conspicuously disclose terms, obtain affirmative consumer consent before imposing a charge, and provide an acknowledgment that contains the terms, the cancellation policy, and a simple cancellation method. California’s 2010 ARL was already broader and more specific than the federal Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act, commonly known as ROSCA and enforced by the FTC. (Read more about ROSCA here.)

In addition to its 2010 requirements for automatic renewal, continuous subscription, or free gift or trial payment plans, approved Senate Bill 313 now requires:

  1. “Clear and conspicuous” explanation of any updates to the price or purchase agreement to be charged after a free gift or trial concludes;
  2. Affirmative consumer consent to non-discounted pricing prior to billing;
  3. Disclosure of how to cancel automatic renewal prior to payment for the continuing service after a free gift or trial; and
  4. An “exclusively online” cancellation mechanism for consumers who originally accepted the service agreement online.

The good news for retailers is that the final law isn’t as stringent as originally intended: The original version required express consumer authorization for the auto-renewal separate from the consumer agreement for the free gift or trial, as well as mandatory notice of the auto-renewal or pricing update a full three days before the new billing takes place.

California’s new law isn’t effective until July 1, 2018, so retailers have time to adapt to the new standards. Change is intimidating, but also provides a healthy incentive to innovate—to evolve marketing tactics, further differentiate brand identity, and highlight a brand’s consumer benefit strategy. By taking these steps while auditing ARL and other compliance, a retailer will be well-positioned to achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace.


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Halloween is a Scary Time for Employers

I have always been fascinated when the shy people that I know suddenly become exhibitionists when it comes to donning Halloween costumes. Whether it is a sexy French maid costume from Victoria’s Secret or Captain Underpants® (from the Dreamworks movie), adult costumes have become much edgier. Those costumes are perfectly fine at a private party or a club.  But when those same people decide to wear these costumes to work, you better have your employment lawyer on speed dial.

If your workplace permits employees to wear costumes on Halloween or you host a Halloween party at your office, you can prevent many employee relations problems and possible lawsuits by reminding employees to use good taste and discretion when choosing costumes. Here are some additional tips to avoid being spooked on October 31st:

  1. Consider preparing a memo to employees with specific costume guidelines in advance of the party. Remind employees that even though it is a Halloween party, they are still at work and therefore, must comply with the Code of Conduct and Anti-Harassment/Anti-Discrimination Policy.
  2. While it is difficult to anticipate every possible costume that is in poor taste, remind employees that they should avoid wearing costumes which make fun of another culture or are overly sexy. I realize that I sound like a prude, but do you really want a sexual harassment claim from a silly Halloween party? Other types of costume themes to avoid at work: anything related to a hate group or Nazi-themed costume, a religious figure, a terrorist organization, or anything that resembles the sexual anatomy of either sex.
  3. Depending on the type of business, remind employees that safety comes first. For example, an employee working in a manufacturing facility should not be wearing a loose-fitting costume or a tail that might get caught in a conveyer belt.
  4. Some employees do not celebrate Halloween for religious reasons (e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses). Therefore, participation in Halloween festivities should not be mandatory.
  5. Remind supervisors that they must lead by example when choosing their costume and act professionally during the party.
  6. Please check our previous blogs for some additional tips here and here.

Halloween parties don’t have to be tricky at work. If planned appropriately, they can be a real treat.

So, I bet you’re wondering, what costume does an employment lawyer wear for Halloween … Supergirl of course! Happy Halloween!

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Has the Rise of Collective Investor Actions in Europe Led to Forum Shopping?

As I have previously noted on this blog (most recently here), one of the most significant recent developments in the D&O claims arena has been the global rise of collective investor actions. One factor in this development in Europe has been the non-binding 2013 Collective Redress Recommendation, in which the European Commission recommended that each of the EU’s 28 member states adopt collective redress mechanisms. Many of the member states have now adopted some form of collective redress but the approaches the various states have taken are not uniform.

In an October 24, 2017 publication entitled “Collective Redress Tourism: Preventing Forum Shopping in the EU” (here), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Forum asks whether the diversity of procedures adopted, and in particular the diversity of safeguards the member states have put in place, along with litigants’ relative freedom to choose between jurisdictions, has led to potentially detrimental forum shopping. The publication raises a number of interesting questions, which I discuss below.

 

Background

As I discussed in a prior post, most EU member states have, pursuant to the European Commission recommendation, adopted some form of collective redress mechanism. As the Institute for Legal Reform’s report notes however, the forms of action adopted involved “vastly different features and are subject to very different safeguards or protections.” Among the variations is the availability of third-party litigation funding; the adoption of opt-in or opt-out regimes, or both; the availability of discovery; and different rules for certification and costs. The report notes further that while EU rules exist to address the question of how courts in the member states should divide and share jurisdiction in cases that have effects in more than one country, there “are no rules at all specific to the allocation of jurisdiction in class actions scenarios.”

Preventing Abuses?

The report acknowledges that the European Commission recommendation did not involve a proscribed system of collective action; rather the recommendation recommended that each member state should introduce collective redress according to its own model and legal system. The recommendation did propose that the member states should adhere to certain features and safeguards, in order, the report states to “limit the incidence of abuse and prevent the growth of frivolous and vexatious litigation that has been so damaging in other jurisdictions, such as the U.S. and Australia.”

Among the abuses the report notes are, for example, the involvement of third-party litigation funders, who, the report states, “are likely to be the main beneficiaries of collective actions,” which “can give rise to situations in which the claimants receive little of nothing and third parties are richly rewarded.” The report also notes that the ability of representatives to proceed on behalf of massed groups of claimants “empowers the representative to threaten a defendant with catastrophic loss” – a form of unequal bargaining power that can be used to extract “what respected jurists call ‘blackmail settlements’ from defendants.”

Diversity of Systems and Safeguards

Despite these risks and the consequent need for safeguards, not all Member States have adopted safeguards to prevent against these abuses, according to the report. Some Member States have adopted “far more ‘open’ systems of collective redress than others and are increasingly becoming magnet jurisdictions for claimants.” The examples the report cites are the U.K.’s adoption of an opt-out class system and the system in the Netherlands allowing “ad-hoc litigation vehicles or foundations” to proceed as representative of large numbers of claimants, often with little nexus to the Netherlands.

The concern involved, the report asserts, is that where, as is currently the case in Europe, it is relatively easy for claimants to move to a jurisdiction of choice, there is “little to prevent such claims from gravitating to jurisdictions where such safeguards will not apply or they will apply less stringently.” The current rules, the report notes, may “create considerable uncertainty for defendants who, in cases of a large class, may not be able to foresee in what jurisdictions they will be sued.”  The report adds that consumers’ interests may also be undermined; for example, in opt-out collective actions, affected consumers could have their rights determined in the courts of another member state without their knowledge of consent.

Forum Shopping?

In support of the assertion that claimants will tend to choose the jurisdiction with “the lowest thresholds and fewest safeguards,” the report cites as examples the purportedly “global” collective investor actions that have been filed in the Netherlands on behalf of BP investors in connection with the Gulf oil spill; on behalf of Volkswagen investors in connection with the Dieselgate scandal (refer here); and in connection with the Petrobras scandal. The driving forces behind these initiatives are U.S. plaintiffs’ law firms and third-party litigation funding firms. These firms, the report states have made a “calculated decision to bring these cases to the Dutch courts, citing, among other things, the Dutch courts’ willingness to assume jurisdiction on a global basis.”

The report goes further to suggest that this state of affairs may lead to a competition between jurisdictions, in which member states adopt mechanisms to avoid “losing out” on the perceived economic opportunities associated with major litigation. The report cites as an example the proposal in The Netherlands to create a “Netherlands Commercial Court” which will offer English language proceedings in front of a specialized court. The dynamic, the report suggests, could create a “race for the bottom,” in which the jurisdiction with the fewest safeguards will attract the most “abusive litigation,” adding the assertion that jurisdictions that have “no reluctance to grant very generous damage awards may become draw jurisdictions.”

Proposed Solutions

In order to address these concerns, the report suggests some “proposed solutions,” to reduce the incentives for claimants to forum shop.  Among other things, the report suggests adjustment to existing rules (the Brussels Regulation) on cross-border litigation and jurisdiction specifically to address collective redress actions. Among other things, the report suggests introducing a new rule in mass claim situations giving jurisdiction to the court where the majority of injured claimants are domiciled; to use the jurisdiction of the place of the defendant’s domicile; or to create a special judicial panel for cross-border collective action with the Court of Justice of European Union.

The report further proposes the adoption of a standard similar to that enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Morrison v. National Australia Bank case, the effect of which, as characterized by the report, was to “end the tendency to try to include the harm suffered by foreign (non-U.S.) plaintiffs in the their U.S. claims.” Such a rule, the report suggests, “would at least already prevent claimants from asking EU courts to assert jurisdiction over parties domiciled outside the EU.”

Discussion

The report is very interesting and the solutions proposed certainly represent worthwhile recommendations as possible ways to ensure that collective actions in EU member countries proceed in a rational and efficient manner. Overall the report is thoughtful and interesting and merits reading at length and in full.

There are a number of important considerations that I think should also be taken into account in consideration and discussion of these ideas and proposals.

The first has to do with the European Commission’s collective action recommendation itself. It is not expressly mentioned in the report, but I think it is very important to keep in mind that the purpose of the European Commission’s 2013 recommendation encouraging the adoption of collective redress actions was to “ensure effective access to justice” so that “citizens and companies can enforce the rights granted to them under EU law where these have been infringed.”  These principles behind the collective redress initiative are important, and I think these principles should be kept in mind both as the current state of affairs is assessed and as proposed changes are considered.

There is another consideration that I think should also be kept in mind, and that has to do with the fact in the 21st century, the global economy is complex, which in turn means that claims and claims processes necessarily will be complex, in many instances. Consumer products affect thousands or even millions of consumers. Company misconduct can affect thousands of investors, in multiple jurisdictions. The existence of collective redress mechanisms may be an arguably is a necessary consequence of the complex global economy in which we live.

Yet another consideration that I think also is relevant is the fact that the very way the European Commission recommendation was set up made it inevitable that there would be significant variation in approaches to collective investor actions across the member states. This approach and the flexibility for the member states to adopt different approaches by definition meant that different jurisdictions would approach the issue differently, and that there would be a variety of procedures put in place; this in turn meant that jurisdictions would adopt different models, at different speeds, offering different alternatives. In other words, it is little wonder that some jurisdictions might have adopted models that, for example, facilitate greater access for claimants.

From my perspective, there is nothing that suggests that merely because a jurisdiction provides more attractive procedures for claimants that abuse is the inevitable result. By the same token, from my perspective, merely because plaintiffs’ attorneys are involved or third-party litigation funders are involved does not mean that abuse is the inevitable result. Here, my perspective is significantly affected by what I have seen with respect to institutional investor claimants. The law firms and funding firms are representing sophisticated institutional investors that are both well-informed about their interests and well-informed about the choices they have made. They are expressly and knowingly choosing to have these firms represent their interests because they are aggrieved and are seeking these firms to represent their interests and recover damages on their behalf. Indeed, to suggest that the mere involvement of these law firms and funding firms constitutes some form of abuse is very dismissive of the active and involved role that the well-informed institutional investors play in this process.

For the same reason, the fact that investors are seeking to resort to the courts of the Netherlands or even the U.K. is not tantamount to abuse or to a race for the bottom. It may simply mean that these jurisdictions have done a better job creating mechanisms that allow aggrieved parties to recoup their losses, not that a race to the bottom is underway.

To be sure, I have the same concerns that the report expresses about some of the lawsuits that claimants recently have attempted to launch in the Netherlands (referring here to the actions recently filed in The Netherlands involving BP, VW, and Petrobras.) There is nothing that says that merely because these cases have been filed that these cases are going to go anywhere. To the contrary, the early evidence is that these cases are going nowhere; for example, one of the cases the report specifically mentioned, the BP Gulf oil spill case, has in fact been dismissed by the Netherlands courts on jurisdictional grounds (about which refer here).

It is important to note that the Netherlands courts have proven to be nobody’s pushover; at the report itself notes, the Amsterdam Court in fact rejected the proposed settlement of the massive $1.3 billion Ageas/Fortis case because of concerns about the proposed payout plan. Merely because claimants have found the Netherlands an attractive place to their claims does not mean that the judiciary in that country is lax or that something contrary to the interests of justice will take place there. And an important question that needs to be asked is whether the claimants would have an equally adequate alternative forum available if the Netherlands were not available to them?

One particular aspect of the threatened race to the bottom that the report cites is the proposal that the Netherlands create a specialized commercial court where disputes will be heard in English. The report tries to suggest that this is some kind of jurisdictional pandering or something like that. I couldn’t disagree more. I happen to think this is a brilliant idea, the equivalent of what the state of Delaware in the U.S. has done by creating its specialized Courts of Chancery, with a dedicated and highly skilled judiciary. The Delaware Chancery Court is the forum of choice in the United States for defendants.  The creation of a specialized commercial court in which potential language concerns are addressed seems to me like the kind of innovation that ought to be encouraged and welcomed, not disparaged as evidence of a jurisdictional race to the bottom.

All of that said, I agree with the report’s fundamental premise that more needs to be done to coordinate collective redress litigation across borders in Europe. The reports proposals are interesting and worth serious discussion. My hope is that as these and similar ideas are considered that sight is not lost of the original idea behind the collective redress mechanism recommendation, which was to ensure effective access to justice and to ensure that citizens and consumers have access to mechanisms to seek redress of their grievances. It would be a poor outcome indeed if as a result of efforts to reconcile these cross-border and jurisdictional issues that aggrieved claimants wind up without adequate or appropriate procedural alternatives to ensure that they can seek and obtain redress.  In that regard, it is critically important to keep in mind that what has been driving the growth of collective investor actions around the world has been a series of corporate scandals that have resulted in large number of aggrieved investors who want – and now expect – redress. Proposed reforms to address jurisdictional concerns, if they are to be valid, must also take these considerations into account.

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Impact of Arbitration Rule CRA Vote on CFPB Regulations

cash and credit cardsThe CFPB’s Arbitration Rule has been sent to the President’s desk to join 14 other federal agency regulations that have been repealed under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The disapproval resolution, which was passed by the House in July, was passed by the Senate late in the evening on October 24. The rule would have prohibited companies from using class action waivers in arbitration agreements.

Restraints on the CFPB Revisiting the Arbitration Rule

Under the CRA, the resolution of disapproval nullifies the finalized Arbitration Rule and prohibits the reissuing of the rule in substantially the same form. The CRA also prohibits the issuing of a new rule that is substantially the same unless that new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule under the CRA.

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In Landmark Decision, Court Defines the Contours of the Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Exception to the TCPA

targeted moneyAs previously discussed on this blog, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) prohibits “telephone solicitations” to numbers listed on the National Do-Not-Call list (NDNC). There is a rarely litigated exception to the TCPA’s do-not-call provisions, however, for calls placed by or on behalf of tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations. On October 11, 2017, in Spiegel v. Reynolds, No. 1:15-cv-08504 (N.D. Ill.), a putative nationwide class action, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held both that (1) the TCPA’s nonprofit exemption from do-not-call liability extends to a professional fundraiser acting on behalf of the nonprofit under federal common law agency principles – even if the majority of the money raised for the nonprofit is paid to the fundraiser; and (2) calls seeking charitable donations are not “telephone solicitations” actionable under the TCPA, even if the donations will be – in part – used to procure goods for charitable recipients.

In Spiegel, the plaintiff claimed that several fundraising calls were placed to his residential telephone number in 2013 and 2014, while his number was on the NDNC list. He sued the principals of the charity, The Breast Cancer Society (Society), as well as the Society’s paid fundraiser, Associated Community Services, Inc. (ACS), alleging that such fundraising calls to him and other United States residents violated the TCPA.

The plaintiff is an experienced TCPA plaintiff, and he knows that calls made by or for nonprofit organizations are beyond the law’s do-not-call reach. To get around this, he asserted that the Society was not a legitimate tax-exempt nonprofit organization, but rather was a “sham” charity (based on an unrelated governmental investigation of the organization’s governance and operations). At the motion to dismiss stage, the court rejected the plaintiff’s “sham charity” theory; the Society had been duly recognized as exempt from federal taxation by the Internal Revenue Service, and the court declined an invitation to second-guess the IRS. The court, however, did allow limited discovery on the plaintiff’s alternative legal theory: that, because ACS retained a majority of the gross revenues from donors’ contributions to the Society, ACS was not truly acting “on behalf of” its charity client. The fundraiser – the plaintiff posited – was really in business for itself and was not the Society’s agent, thus depriving it of the nonprofit exemption’s protection from TCPA liability.

In a sweeping victory in an area where, as the court noted, “case law applying the TCPA nonprofit exemption is sparse,” the court awarded summary judgment to ACS, the defendant-professional fundraiser. The court first concluded that ACS acted in the Society’s interest and as the Society’s agent and, as such, was exempted of TCPA liability for the calls. The court specifically focused on the contractual arrangement between ACS and the Society and how that arrangement was executed between the parties. Under the arrangement, the Society was able to exercise control over the manner of ACS’ solicitations by retaining the right to review, modify, and veto the solicitation scripts. Additionally, the Society controlled the flow of cash from the fundraising campaign. And, as the court explained, “the actual conduct of the parties reflect[ed] a genuine agency relationship.” Notably, the court flatly rejected the plaintiff’s cornerstone argument that the applicability of the TCPA’s tax-exempt, nonprofit exemption depended on the percentage of funds received by the nonprofit, as opposed to the fundraiser, from every donation dollar:

[I]n addition to being a poor legal standard, interpreting the nonprofit exemption to include a percentage-of-funds threshold would likely cause the TCPA to run afoul of the first amendment… . The fact that ACS kept the lion’s share of the money also does not help [plaintiff]. The essence of the nonprofit exemption is the recognition that some charities find it advantageous to contract out their fundraising efforts to private companies. But the TCPA does not require that the terms of these contracts be favorable to the nonprofit. In fact, asking the courts to scrutinize those relationships would come close to litigating the nonprofit’s tax-exempt status – a job that Congress assigned to the IRS, not the courts.

The court further concluded that ACS also merited summary judgment on the ground that the applicability of the TCPA’s do-not-call provisions to “telephone solicitations” does not extend to requests for donations because such donation calls do not “encourage[e] the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services” – the definition of telephone solicitation.

Although this decision resulted in a big win for ACS, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, and their paid fundraisers, courts will continue to look closely at the specifics of the relationship between the parties when applying the TCPA’s exemption, and analyze the exemption’s applicability on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, charities and paid fundraisers should not lose sight of the fact that charity regulators closely scrutinize (and are often suspicious of) relationships that appear to be disproportionately advantageous to the fundraiser. And, while the Spiegel decision may head off TCPA litigation against nonprofits and their fundraisers in the future, it likely will do little to ebb the heavy flow of TCPA litigation that continues in state and federal courts. (A list of recent TCPA filings is available here.)

Venable LLP served as counsel to Associated Community Services, Inc. in the Spiegel litigation.


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